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This paper estimates the degree of variation over time in the price for bearing ex-
posure to U.S. corporate default risk during 2000-2004, based on the relationship
between default probabilities, as estimated by Moody’s KMV EDFs, and default
swap (CDS) market rates. The default-swap data, obtained through CIBC from 39
banks and specialty dealers, allow us to establish a strong link between actual and
risk-neutral default probabilities in the three sectors that we analyze: broadcasting
and entertainment, healthcare, and oil and gas. We ﬁnd dramatic variation over time
in risk premia, from peaks in the third quarter of 2002, dropping by roughly 50% to
late 2003.Default Risk Premia 1
This paper estimates the degree of variation over time in the price for bearing
default risk, above and beyond expected default loss, for U.S. corporate debt. We
exploit the close but time-varying relationship between default probabilities, as esti-
mated by the Moody’s KMV EDF measure, and default swap (CDS) market rates.
Our default-swap data, obtained by CIBC from 39 banks and specialty dealers, al-
low us to establish a strong link between actual and risk-neutral default probabilities
for the 93 ﬁrms in the three sectors that we analyzed: broadcasting and entertain-
ment, healthcare, and oil and gas. Based on over 180,000 CDS rate quotes, 5-year
EDFs explain over 74% of the variation in 5-year CDS rates across issuers and time,
controlling for non-linearity and for sectoral and time ﬁxed eﬀects. For a given default
probability, we ﬁnd substantial variation over time in credit spreads. For example,
after peaking in the third quarter of 2002, credit risk premia declined steadily and
dramatically through late 2003, when, for a given default probability, credit spreads
were on average roughly 50% lower than at their peak. For example, ﬁxing a default
probability, CDS rates were 41% lower in December 2003 than in August 2002 in the
oil-and gas-sector, 69% lower in the broadcasting-and-entertainment sector, and 49%
lower in the healthcare sector.
A potential explanation for these declines in default risk premia is that by mid-
2002 the corporate debt market had experienced a reduction in risk-bearing capacity,
relative to the amount of risk to be borne, driving risk premia to relatively high levels
at that time. This may have been due in part to large default losses in prior months
and increases in market volatility, perhaps exacerbated by frictions in the entry of
new risk capital. Under this hypothesis, fresh capital ﬂowed into this market over
the subsequent months in order to take advantage of the high risk premiums oﬀered,
eventually (but not immediately) driving these risk premia down. This is similar
to the explanation oﬀered by Froot and O’Connell (1999) for dramatic increases in
catastrophic risk insurance premia after major losses of capital, with subsequent slowDefault Risk Premia 2
declines in premia over time as new capital is attracted into the sector. Consistent
with this interpretation, we ﬁnd that credit risk premia are strongly dependent on
general stock-market volatility, as measured by the VIX, after controlling for the
inﬂuence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc volatility on default probabilities. This may simply reﬂect
the fact that credit spreads match the supply and demand for risk bearing: when the
amount of available capital for bearing default risk is small relative to the level of
risk, the price for bearing a given amount of default risk is higher. We are not aware,
however, of evidence that the market price of risk in equity markets varies to such
a large degree over similarly short periods of time, including this particular period.
We will discuss whether the measured reductions in default risk premia could also
be inﬂuenced by errors in estimating default probabilities, by “reaching for yield” by
money managers, or by changes in expected recoveries in the event of default, among
other potential explanations.
Our study is based on an extensive database of credit default swap (CDS) rates
from CIBC, and on Moody’s KMV estimated default frequency (EDF) data. First
panel-regression models, and then arbitrage-free term-structure time-series models,
are used to estimate how default risk premia vary over time. Previous work such as
Driessen (2005) has established evidence that risk-neutral default probabilities are
signiﬁcantly higher than actual default probabilities. This ratio may be viewed as
the proportional premium for bearing default risk. For example, if this ratio is 2.0
(for a particular ﬁrm, date, and maturity), then market-based insurance of default
would be priced at roughly twice the expected discounted default loss. In terms of
the average over time of default risk premia, our evidence is generally consistent with
previous work. Our main focus is the degree to which these premia vary over time.
We explore various alternative interpretations of our ﬁnding that the risk premia do
indeed vary dramatically.
A weakness of our study is the lack of data bearing on risk-neutral mean loss givenDefault Risk Premia 3
default (LGD). The highest annual cross-sectional sample mean of loss given default
during our sample period was reported by Altman, Brady, Resti, and Sironi (2003) to
be approximately 75%. Using 75% as a rough estimate for risk-neutral mean loss given
default, our measured relationship between CDS and EDF implies that short-term
risk-neutral default probabilities are roughly double their actual-probability counter-
parts, on average, although this premium is higher for high-quality ﬁrms than for
low-quality ﬁrms, and higher for ﬁrms in the broadcasting-and-entertainment sector
than for oil-and-gas or healthcare ﬁrms. In particular, this ratio was dramatically
higher in mid-2002 than in late 2003. If the risk-neutral mean LGD were constant
over time, at any particular level, then our results on relative changes over time in
default risk premia would be largely unaﬀected by the assumed level of risk-neutral
mean LGD. The results of Altman, Brady, Resti, and Sironi (2003), however, indicate
that average realized LGDs tend to be positively correlated with aggregate default
rates. As a robustness check, we provide some indication of the potential impact of
such correlation on estimated CDS rates.
As an illustrative example, Figure 1, which shows estimated actual and risk-
neutral 1-year default probabilities for Disney, is consistent with the typical pattern
in our sample of high default risk premia in the third quarter of 2002, particularly
in the broadcasting-and-entertainment sector. More generally, Figure 2 shows the
median, within the broadcasting-and-entertainment sector, of the estimated ratios of
risk-neutral to actual default probabilities at each of three maturities: instantaneously
short, one year, and ﬁve years.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I places our work in
the context of prior empirical research on default risk premia. Section II describes our
data, including a discussion of the terms of default swap contracts and an overview of
the construction of the Moody’s KMV EDF measure of default probability. Section
III presents panel-regression evidence of a strong relationship between CDS ratesDefault Risk Premia 4






































Figure 1: Estimated actual and risk-neutral 1-year default probabilities for Disney.
and EDFs across several sectors, with higher risk premia for high-quality ﬁrms, and
dramatically declining risk premia from mid-2002 to late 2003. Section IV introduces
a time-series model of actual default intensities, and our methodology for maximum-
likelihood parameter estimation. Section IV also contains parameter estimates for
each ﬁrm, based on 12 years of monthly observations of 1-year EDFs for each ﬁrm.
Section V provides a reduced-form pricing model for default swaps, based on time-
series models of actual and risk-neutral default intensities. Section B introduces our
parameterization of the time-series model for risk-neutral default intensities, using
both EDFs and CDS rates. Section C provides estimates of the parameters for each
of the three sectors. Section VI provides a discussion of the implications of the results.Default Risk Premia 5




























































Figure 2: Within-sector medians of the ratios of risk-neutral to actual default probabilities, for the
broadcasting-and-entertainment sector, at various maturities.
I. Prior Literature
While Fisher (1959) took a simple regression approach to explaining yield spreads on
corporate debt in terms of various credit-quality and liquidity related variables, Fons
(1987) gave the earliest empirical analysis, to our knowledge, of the relationship be-
tween actual and risk-neutral default probabilities. Driessen (2005) estimated the re-
lationship between actual and risk-neutral default probabilities, using U.S. corporate
bond price data (rather than CDS data), and assuming that conditional default prob-
abilities are equal to average historical default frequencies by credit rating. Driessen
reported an average ratio of risk-neutral to actual default intensities of 1.89, after
accounting for tax and liquidity eﬀects, roughly in line with our estimates. While
the conceptual foundations of Driessen’s study are similar to ours, there are substan-
tial diﬀerences in our respective research objectives, data sources, and methodology.
First, the time periods covered are diﬀerent. Second, the corporate bonds underlyingDefault Risk Premia 6
Driessen’s study are less homogeneous with respect to their sectors, and have sig-
niﬁcant heterogeneity with respect to maturity, coupon, and time period. Each of
our CDS rate observations, on the other hand, is eﬀectively a new 5-year par-coupon
credit spread on the underlying ﬁrm that is not as corrupted, we believe, by tax and
liquidity eﬀects, as are corporate bond spreads. (Driessen estimated the portion of
the bond yield spread that is associated with taxes.) Third, and most importantly
in terms of our objective of examining time variation in default risk premia, we do
not assume that current conditional default probabilities are equal to historical av-
erage default frequencies by credit rating. Kavvathas (2001) and others have shown
that, for a given ﬁrm at a given time, the historical default frequency by ﬁrms of the
same rating is a stale and coarse-grained estimator of conditional default probability.
Moody’s KMV EDF measures of default probability provide signiﬁcantly more power
to discriminate among the default probabilities of ﬁrms (Kealhofer (2003), Kurbat
and Korbalev (2002), Bohn, Arora, and Korablev (2005)). This is not a critical issue
for Driessen’s results, because he does not focus on time variation in risk premia, but
rather reports the average over time of risk premia, by rating.
Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) show that CDS rates represent somewhat
fresher price information than do bond yield spreads. This may be due to the fact
that default swaps are “un-funded exposures,” in the language of dealers, meaning
that in order to execute a trade, neither cash nor the underlying bonds need to be
immediately sourced and exchanged. Default swap rates are therefore less likely to
be aﬀected by market illiquidity than are bond yield spreads. The extent of this
diﬀerence in liquidity is explored in Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005). The notional
amount of debt covered by default swaps has been roughly doubling each year for the
past decade, and in 2007 is estimated to be over 30 trillion U.S. dollars, according to
the British Bankers Association (www.bba.org).
Bohn (2000), Delianedis and Geske (1998), Delianedis, Geske, and Corzo (1998),Default Risk Premia 7
and Huang and Huang (2003) use structural approaches to estimating the relation-
ship between actual and risk-neutral default probabilities, generally assuming that
the Black-Scholes-Merton model applies to the asset value process, and assuming
constant volatility. Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004) have found that these struc-
tural models tend to ﬁt the data rather poorly, and typically underestimate credit
spreads, especially for shorter maturity bonds. Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein
(2005) show an improvement in ﬁt by incorporating an assumption of counter-cyclical
default boundaries. New work by Saita (2005) estimates the high levels of risk premia
that can be obtained for portfolios of corporate debt through diversiﬁcation.
II. The EDF and CDS Data
This section discusses our data sources for conditional default probabilities and for
default swap rates.
A. The EDF Data
Moody’s KMV provides its customers with, among other data, current ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm
estimates of conditional probabilities of default over time horizons that include the
benchmark horizons of 1 and 5 years. For a given ﬁrm and time horizon, this “EDF”
estimate of default probability is ﬁt non-parametrically from the historical default fre-
quency of other ﬁrms that had the same estimated “distance to default” as the target
ﬁrm. The distance to default of a given ﬁrm is a leverage measure adjusted for current
market asset volatility. Roughly speaking, distance to default is the number of stan-
dard deviations of annual asset growth by which the ﬁrm’s expected assets at a given
maturity exceed a measure of book liabilities. The liability measure is, in the current
implementation of the EDF model, the ﬁrm’s short-term book liabilities plus one half
of its long-term book liabilities. Estimates of current assets and the current standardDefault Risk Premia 8
deviation of asset growth (“volatility”) are calibrated from historical observations of
the ﬁrm’s equity-market capitalization and of the liability measure. The calibration,
explained for example in Vassalou and Xing (2004), is based on the model of Black
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), by which the price of a ﬁrm’s equity may be
viewed as the price of an option on assets struck at the level of liabilities. Crosbie and
Bohn (2002) and Kealhofer (2003) provide more details on the KMV model and the
ﬁtting procedures for distance to default and EDF. Bharath and Shumway () show
that the ﬁtting procedure is relatively robust. Duﬃe, Saita, and Wang (2007) and
Bharath and Shumway () show that, although distance to default (DD) is a suﬃcient
explanatory variable for conditional default probabilities in the theoretical models of
Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974), Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), and
Leland and Toft (1996), among others, some incremental predictive power can be
obtained by including some additional ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macro-economic explanatory
variables.
While one could criticize the EDF measure as an estimator of the “true” con-
ditional default probability, it has some important merits for business practice and
for our study, relative to other available approaches to estimating conditional default
probabilities. First, the Moody’s KMV EDF is readily available for essentially all
public U.S. companies, and for a large fraction of foreign public ﬁrms. (There is a
private-ﬁrm EDF model, which we do not rely on, since our CDS data are for public
ﬁrms.) The EDF is ﬁtted non-parametrically to the distance to default, and is there-
fore not especially sensitive, at least on average, to model mis-speciﬁcation. While
the measured distance to default is itself based on a theoretical option-pricing model,
the function that maps DD to EDF is consistently estimated in a stationary setting,
even if the underlying theoretical relationship between DD and default probability
does not apply. That is, conditional on only the distance to default, the measured
EDF is equal to the “true” DD-conditional default probability as the number of ob-Default Risk Premia 9
servations goes to inﬁnity, under typical mixing and other technical conditions for
non-parametric qualitative-response estimation.
A common industry measure of default likelihood is the average historical de-
fault frequency of ﬁrms with the same credit rating as the target ﬁrm. This mea-
sure is often used, for example, in implementations of the CreditMetrics approach
(www.creditmetrics.com), and is convenient given the usual practice by ﬁnancial-
services ﬁrms of tracking credit quality by internal credit ratings based on the ap-
proach of the major recognized rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard and
Poors. The ratings agencies, however, do not claim that their ratings are intended
to be a measure of default probability, and they acknowledge a tendency to adjust
ratings only gradually to new information, a tendency strongly apparent in the em-
pirical analysis of Behar and Nagpal (1999), Lando and Skødeberg (2002), Kavvathas
(2001), and Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto (2000), among others. This tendency to
adjust ratings gradually is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows dramatic variation in
default rates by rating depending on whether the prior rating was higher or lower.
Bohn, Arora, and Korablev (2005) report that the Moody’s KMV EDF measure has
an out-of-sample accuracy ratio1 for our sample period, 2000-2004, of 0.84, as op-
posed to an accuracy ratio of 0.72 for ratings-based default prediction. Duﬃe, Saita,
and Wang (2007) describe a more elaborate default prediction model, using distance
to default as well as other covariates, that achieves an accuracy ratio that is slightly
higher than that of the EDF during this period. In Section VI, we discuss the degree
to which our results on time variation in default risk premia may be inﬂuenced by
the accuracy of the EDF measure.
The Moody’s KMV EDF measure is also extensively used in the ﬁnancial services
industry. For example, from information provided to us by Moody’s KMV, 40 of
the world’s 50 largest ﬁnancial institutions are subscribers. Indeed, Moody’s KMV

































Figure 3: Three-year average default rates by rating, 1996-2003 data. Within rating, average
default rates are also shown for the subset of ﬁrms in that rating whose prior rating was higher, and
the subset whose prior rating was lower. Source: Moody’s, 2004.
estimates of which we are aware, covering over 26,000 publicly traded ﬁrms.
Our basic analysis in Section 3 directly relates daily observations of 5-year CDS
rates to the associated daily 5-year EDF observations. For our time-series model of
default intensities, however, we turn in Section IV to 12 years of monthly observations
of 1-year EDFs. By sampling monthly rather than daily, we mitigate equity market
microstructure noise, including intra-week seasonality in equity prices, and we also
avoid some of the intra-month seasonality in EDFs caused by monthly uploads of
ﬁrm-level accounting liability data. By using 1-year EDFs rather than 5-year EDFs,
our intensity estimates are less sensitive to model mis-speciﬁcation, as the 1-year EDF
is theoretically much closer to the intensity than is the 5-year EDF. As a robustness
check, we have also ﬁt our time-series model of default risk premia to 5-year EDF
data; the results are similar in major respects to those reported here.
B. Default Swaps and the CDS Database
A default swap, often called (with inexplicable redundancy) a “credit default swap”
(CDS), is an over-the-counter derivative security designed to transfer credit risk.Default Risk Premia 11
With minor exceptions, a default swap is economically equivalent to a bond insur-
ance contract. The buyer of protection pays periodic (usually quarterly) insurance
premiums until the expiration of the contract or until a contractually deﬁned credit
event, whichever is earlier. For our data, the stipulated credit event is default by
the named ﬁrm. If the credit event occurs before the expiration of the default swap,
the buyer of protection receives from the seller of protection the diﬀerence between
the face value and the market value of the underlying debt. The buyer of protection
normally has the option to substitute other types of debt of the underlying named
obligor. The most popular settlement mechanism at default is for the buyer of protec-
tion to submit to the seller of protection debt instruments of the named ﬁrm, of the
total notional amount speciﬁed in the default-swap contract, and to receive in return a
cash payment equal to that notional amount, less the fraction of the default-swap pre-
mium that has accrued (on a time-proportional basis) since the last regular premium
payment date. Recently, the market has introduced an auction for cash settlement of
CDS for cases involving major defaults, such as those in 2005 of Collins-Aikman and
Delphi, in order to avoid settlement disruptions caused by a shortage of transferable
debt instruments of the underlying name, relative to the number and sizes of required
settlement trades.
The CDS rate is the annualized premium rate, as a fraction of the face value of
debt covered. Using an actual-360 day-count convention, the CDS rate is thus four
times the quarterly premium. Our observations are at-market, meaning that they
are bids or oﬀers of the default-swap rates at which a buyer or seller of protection
is proposing to enter into new default swap contracts, without an up-front payment.
Because there is no initial exchange of cash ﬂows on a standard default swap, the
at-market CDS rate is, in theory, that for which the net market value of the contract
is zero. In practice, there are implicit dealer margins that we treat by assuming that
the average of the bid and ask CDS rates is the rate at which the market value of theDefault Risk Premia 12
default swap is indeed zero.
For the purpose of settlement of default swaps, the contractual deﬁnition of default
normally allows for bankruptcy, a material failure by the obligor to make payments
on its debt, or a restructuring of its debt that is materially adverse to the inter-
ests of creditors. (This is the same deﬁnition of default used for purposes of the
Moody’s KMV EDF estimator of default probability.) The coverage of default swaps
for restructuring has been a question of debate among the community of buyers and
sellers of protection. Banks, especially European banks, generally prefer to include
restructuring as a covered default event, given the relatively greater exposure of bank
loans (versus traded bonds) to restructuring risk. ISDA, the industry coordinator of
standardized default-swap contracts, has arranged a consensus contractual deﬁnition
of default and coverage in the event of default that is likely to be reﬂected in most
of our data. This consensus deﬁnition has been adjusted over time, however, and to
the extent that these adjustments during our observation period are material, or to
the degree of heterogeneity in our data over the deﬁnition of default that is applied,
our results could be aﬀected. The contractual deﬁnition of default can aﬀect the
estimated risk-neutral implied default probabilities, since of course a wider deﬁnition
of default implies a higher risk-neutral default probability.
For a given level of seniority (our data are based on senior unsecured debt instru-
ments), there is less recovery-value heterogeneity if the event of default is bankruptcy
or failure to pay, for these events normally trigger cross-acceleration covenants that
cause debt of equal seniority to convert to immediate obligations that are pari passu,
that is, of equal legal priority. If restructuring is included as a contractually covered
credit event, however, then there is the potential for signiﬁcant heterogeneity at de-
fault in the market values of the various debt instruments of the obligor, as fractions
of their respective principals, especially when there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity with
respect to maturity. The resulting cheapest-to-deliver option can therefore increaseDefault Risk Premia 13
the loss to the seller of protection in the event of default. Without, at this stage, data
bearing on the heterogeneity of market value of the pool of deliverable obligations for
each default swap, we are in eﬀect treating the cheapest-to-deliver option value as a
constant that is absorbed into the estimated risk-neutral mean fractional loss given
default, L∗, to the seller of protection in the event of default. While we vary L∗ across
sectors, we generally assume that L∗ is constant across time. To the extent that L∗
varies over time or across issuers, our implied risk-neutral default probabilities would
be corrupted.
The impact of the cheapest-to-deliver option is, within the current “modiﬁed”
and “modiﬁed-modiﬁed” ISDA contractual standards, mitigated by a contractual
restriction on the types of deliverable debt instruments, especially with respect to
maturity. While there is a tendency for a diﬀerent standard for European (usually
“modiﬁed-modiﬁed”) versus U.S. ﬁrms (usually “modiﬁed”), all of our data are for
U.S. ﬁrms. Restructurings are also associated with higher average default recoveries.2
Ignoring the cheapest-to-deliver eﬀect, the CDS rate is, in frictionless markets,
a close approximation of the par-coupon credit spread of the same maturity as the
default swap, due to arbitrage reasoning shown by Duﬃe (1999). Our results thus
speak to the relationship between EDFs and corporate credit spreads. Indeed, that
par credit spreads are relatively close to CDS rates is conﬁrmed in the empirical
analysis of Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), provided one measures bond spreads
relative to interest-rate swap yields, rather than treasury yields, which can be con-
taminated by tax exemption of coupon income, repo specials, and liquidity eﬀects.
To the extent that CDS rates diﬀer from bond credit spreads, Blanco, Brennan, and
Marsh (2005) indicate that CDS rates tend to reﬂect slightly fresher information.
Our CIBC data set consists of over 180,000 intra-day CDS rate quotes on 93 ﬁrms
from three Moody’s industry groups. The anonymous sources of these quotes include
27 investment banks and 12 default-swap brokers. The concentration of the numberDefault Risk Premia 14
Figure 4: Distribution of CDS quote providers by number of quotes provided. Data source: CIBC.
of quotes by source is shown in Figure 4. A weakness of our study is that a single
broker-dealer is the source for almost 60% of our observations.
We selected three representative Moody’s-deﬁned North American industry groups:
Broadcasting and Entertainment, Oil and Gas, and Healthcare. The CDS quotes are
for 1-year and 5-year, quarterly premium, senior unsecured, US-Dollar-denominated,
at-the-money default swaps. The 5-year quotes are the most liquid, and are the basis
for our panel-regression analysis. (Our main time-series analysis relies more heavily
on the 5-year benchmark, allowing for noisy observation of the 1-year quotes. We
do explore a variant, described in Section 4, in which both the 1-year and the 5-year
CDS are assumed to be measured with error.) A company from any of these three
sectors is included in our time-series analysis if and only if at least 1,000 historical
pairs of CDS bid and ask quotes for that ﬁrm were available during the sample pe-
riod. The range of credit qualities of the included ﬁrms may be judged from Figure 5,
which shows, for each credit rating, the number of ﬁrms in our study of that median
Moody’s rating during the sample period. Figure 5 indicates a concentration of Baa-
rated ﬁrms. Daily CDS mid-point rate quotes were estimated from intra-day bid and
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Figure 5: Number of ﬁrms by median credit rating during the sample period. Sources: CIBC and
Moody’s.
The ﬁrms that we studied from the broadcasting-and-entertainment industry are
listed in Table I, along with their median 1-year EDF and median Moody’s credit
rating during the sample period from June 2000 to December 2004, and the number
of CDS quotes available for each. The same information covering ﬁrms from the
healthcare and oil-and-gas industries is provided in Appendix B.
III. Panel Regression Analysis
In order to inform the parameterization of our time-series model, and to obtain a
simple and relatively robust measure of the sensitivity of credit spreads (CDS rates)
to default probabilities, we undertook a panel-regression analysis of all 33,912 paired
EDF and median4 CDS observations from December 2000 through December 2004,
for our 3 sectors. Outliers that could be identiﬁed unambiguously were removed
manually.
A simple preliminary ordinary-least-squares (OLS) linear model of the relationshipDefault Risk Premia 16
Table I: Broadcasting and Entertainment Firms
Name of Firm Median EDF Median Rating No. Quotes
(basis points)
Adelphia Communications Corp 378 N/A 228
Belo Corp 6 Baa3 1,168
Brunswick Corp 9 Baa2 1,390
Charter Communications Inc 600 N/A 456
Clear Channel CommunicationsInc 41 Baa3 3,330
Comcast Cable Communications – Baa3 1,182
Comcast Corp 40 Baa3 2,723
Cox Communications Inc 17 Baa3 4,956
Cox Enterprises Inc – Baa3 1,058
Historic TW Inc – Baa1 1,462
Interpublic Group of Cos Inc 229 Baa3 1,095
Knight-Ridder Inc 3 A2 1,290
LibertyMediaCorp 48.5 Baa3 2,244
Mediacom Communications Corp 857 Caa1 168
News America Holdings – N/A 1,165
News America Inc – Baa3 1,679
OmnicomGroup 38 Baa1 2,539
Primedia Inc 939.5 B3 332
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd 107 Ba2 1,043
Sabre Holdings Corp 64.5 Baa2 1,467
Time Warner Inc 135 Baa1 5,549
Viacom Inc 18 A3 3,997
Walt Disney Co 23 Baa1 4,459
between a ﬁrm’s 5-year CDS rate and its annualized 5-year EDF, measured in basis
points on the same day, reveals that the CDS rate increases on average by roughly 16
basis points for each 10 basis point increase in the 5-year EDF. If one were to take the
risk-neutral expected loss given default to be, say, 75% and the annual conditional
default probabilities to be constant over time, this would imply an average ratio of
risk-neutral to actual annual default probabilities of approximately (16/0.75)/10, or
2.0, roughly consistent with the results of Driessen (2005). The associated coeﬃcient
of determination, R2, is 0.73.
Linearity of the CDS-EDF relationship, however, is placed in doubt by a sizable
intercept estimate of roughly 33 basis points, more than 30 times its standard error.
Absent an unexpectedly large liquidity impact on CDS rates, the ﬁtted default swap
rate should be closer to zero at low levels of EDF. While there may be mis-speciﬁcationDefault Risk Premia 17
due to the assumed homogeneity of the relationship over time and across ﬁrms, we
have veriﬁed with sector and time ﬁxed eﬀects that the associated intercept estimates
are unreasonably large in magnitude. Scatter plots of the CDS-EDF relationship
also reveal a pronounced concavity at low levels of EDF. That is, the sensitivity of
credit spreads to a ﬁrm’s default probability seems to decline as default probabilities
increase. There is also apparent heteroskedasticity, with dramatically greater variance
for higher EDFs. The slope of the ﬁt is thus heavily inﬂuenced by the CDS-to-EDF
relationship for lower-quality ﬁrms.
In order to mitigate the eﬀects of non-linearity and heteroskedasticity, we consid-
ered the log-log speciﬁcation5
logYi = α + β logXi + zi, (1)
where (Yi,Xi) is the i-th observed matched pair of 5-year CDS rate and 5-year EDF for
the same ﬁrm on a given date, for coeﬃcients α and β, and a residual zi. The ﬁt, which
has an R2 of 0.69, is illustrated in Figure 6, showing much less heteroskedasticity.
(One notes granularity associated with integer variation in EDFs of extremely high-
quality ﬁrms.) One might have considered a model in which the CDS rate is ﬁt to
both 5-year and 1-year EDF observations, given the potential for additional inﬂuences
of near-term default risk on CDS rates. We have found, however, that the 1-year and
5-year EDFs are extremely highly correlated. As might be expected, adding 1-year
EDFs to the regression has no major impact on the quality of ﬁtted CDS rates, and
involves substantial noise in the slope coeﬃcients.
We also control for changes in the CDS-to-EDF relationship across time and across
sectors. Appendix Table X presents the results of a regression of the logarithm of
the daily median CDS rate on the logarithm of the associated daily 5-year EDF
observation, including dummy variables for sectors and months. (The oil-and-gasDefault Risk Premia 18














































Figure 6: Scatter plot of EDF and CDS observations, logarithmic, and OLS ﬁtted relationship.
Source: CIBC (CDS) and Moody’s KMV (EDF).
sector for December 2004 is the reference sector and month.) With an R2 of 74.4%,
the ﬁtted model for the oil-and-gas sector may be summarized as
logCDSi = 1.45 + 0.76 logEDFi +
X
j,k
ˆ βj,kDj,k(i) + zi, (2)
(0.046) (0.015)
where ˆ βj,k denotes the estimate for the dummy multiplier for month j and sector
k, tabulated in Appendix Table X, Dj,k(i) is 1 if observation i is from month j
and sector k and zero otherwise, and zi denotes the residual. The standard-error
estimates reported here and in Appendix Table X are “robust” to heteroskedasticity
and correlation of disturbances, using the usual generalized-least-squares estimator
for the covariance matrix of regressor coeﬃcients for panel-data regressions, found,
for example, in Woolridge (2002), Section 7.8.4.Default Risk Premia 19
The standard error for (2) of approximately 0.52, and an assumption of normally
distributed disturbances, imply a one-standard-deviation conﬁdence band for a given
CDS rate of between 59% and 169% of the ﬁtted rate. While the CDS data are noisy in
this sense, the relationship between CDS and EDF is highly signiﬁcant, and variation
in EDF on its own explains a large fraction (an R2 of about 69%, before controlling for
time and sector eﬀects) of variation in CDS rates. For the reference sector and month,
oil and gas for December, 2004, ﬁve-year mean default rates of 10, 110, and 210 basis
points per year are associated6 with estimated CDS rates, assuming normality of
disturbances, of approximately 28, 161, and 283 basis points, respectively. While the
linear-in-logs model captures the apparent declining marginal impact of EDFs on CDS
rates, if one were to apply this model to suﬃciently high EDFs (above our maximum
EDF observation of 2000 basis points), it would eventually imply risk-neutral default
probabilities that are below actual default probabilities. Indeed, Figure 6 seems to
illustrate a tendency for the linear-in-logs model to understate CDS rates at the
highest observed EDFs. A slightly more ﬂexible non-linear model might be preferred.
Figure 7 shows, for each sector k, variation over month j of e
ˆ βj,k, an estimate of the
proportional variation over time of risk premia. That is, e
ˆ βj,k is the ratio of the ﬁtted
default swap rate for a ﬁrm in sector k at month j, to that of an oil-and-gas ﬁrm with
the same default probability in December 2004. (The maximum of the standard errors
of the dummy-variable coeﬃcients shown in Table X is 0.03, indicating a proportional
standard deviation in the estimate of e
ˆ βj,k of approximately 3% or lower.) Figure 7
indicates dramatic variation over time in risk premia. From August 2002 to December
2003, for a ﬁxed default probability, the estimated reduction7 in CDS rates is 41% for
the oil-and-gas sector, 69% for the broadcasting-and-entertainment sector, and 49%
for the healthcare sector. The broadcasting-and-entertainment sector, in particular,
shows dramatic reductions in risk premia from mid 2002 (around the times of default
of Adelphia and Worldcom) to late 2003. Section 5 provides additional evidence ofDefault Risk Premia 20
Figure 7: The multipliers for estimated 5-year CDS rates, over time and sector, at a ﬁxed 5-year
EDF. These are the exponentials of the dummy coeﬃcients in the log-CDS-to-log-EDF model (2).
variation over time of default risk premia that is revealed through ﬁtted time-series
models of actual and risk-neutral default intensities.
Some of the cross-sector diﬀerences in CDS rates may due to sectoral diﬀerences
in the behavior of loss given default. For example, assuming that the ratio of the risk-
neutral mean loss given default in the oil-and-gas sector to another sector is the same
as the ratio of the empirical average historical loss given default reported by Moody’s8
for 1982 to 2003, broadcasting-entertainment CDS rates would be approximately
62%/52% − 1 = 19% higher than those of the oil-and-gas sector, for equal risk-
neutral default probabilities. Similarly, healthcare spreads would be approximately
67%/52%−1 = 29% higher than those of the oil-and-gas sector, for equal risk-neutral
default probabilities.Default Risk Premia 21
IV. Default Intensity Time-Series Model
We turn to the time-series behavior of actual and risk-neutral default probabilities,
measured through ﬁrm-level default intensities. We adopt a parameterization that
allows a decomposition of time variation in risk premia due to changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
default probabilities and due to changes in market-wide default risk premia. In this
section, we focus exclusively on actual default intensities. The next section focuses
on risk-neutral default intensities.
The default intensity of an obligor is the mean arrival rate of default, conditional
on all current information. To be slightly more precise, we suppose that default for a
given ﬁrm occurs at the ﬁrst event time of a (non-explosive) counting process N with
intensity process λ, relative to a given probability space (Ω,F,P) and information
ﬁltration {Ft : t ≥ 0} satisfying the usual conditions. In this case, so long as the
obligor survives, we say that its default intensity at time t is λt. Under mild technical
conditions, this means that, conditional on survival to time t and all information
available at time t, the probability of default between times t and t+h is approximately
λth for small h. We also adopt the relatively standard simplifying doubly-stochastic,
or Cox-process, assumption, under which the conditional probability at time t, for a













For our analysis, we ignore mis-speciﬁcation of the EDF model itself, by assuming
that 1 − p(t,t + 1) is indeed the current 1-year EDF. From the Moody’s KMV data,
then, we observe p(t,t + 1) at successive dates t, t + h, t + 2h,..., where h is one
month. From these observations, we estimate a time-series model of the underlying
intensity process λ, for each ﬁrm. (Econometrically, this is essentially the same as
estimating the time-series behavior of a short-term interest-rate process from one-yearDefault Risk Premia 22
zero-coupon bond prices in an economy with no interest-rate risk premia.)
After some preliminary diagnostic analysis of the EDF data set, we opted to specify
a model under which the logarithm Xt = logλt of the default intensity satisﬁes the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck equation
dXt = κ(θ − Xt)dt + σdBt, (4)
where B is a standard Brownian motion, and θ, κ, and σ are constants to be estimated.
The behavior for λ = eX is sometimes called a Black-Karasinski model.9 This leaves
us with a vector Θ = (θ,κ,σ) of unknown parameters to estimate from the available
monthly EDF observations of a given ﬁrm. We have 144 months of 1-year EDF
observations for most of the ﬁrms in our sample, for the period January, 1993, to
December, 2004.
In general, given the log-autoregressive form (4) of the default intensity, there
is no closed-form solution available for the 1-year EDF, 1 − p(t,t + 1), from (3).10
We therefore rely on numerical lattice-based calculations of p(t,t + 1). We have
implemented the two-stage procedure for constructing trinomial trees proposed by
Hull and White (1994).
The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) ˆ Θ of the parameter vector Θ is then
obtained, ﬁrm by ﬁrm, using a ﬁtting algorithm described in the appendix. That is,
for a given ﬁrm, ˆ Θ solves
supΘ L({1 − p(ti,ti + 1) : 1 ≤ i ≤ N}; 1 − p(t0,t0 + 1), Θ),
where t0,t1,...,tN are the N +1 observation times for the given ﬁrm, and L denotes
the likelihood score of observed EDFs conditioned on the ﬁrst observation and given
Θ. This is not a routine MLE for a discretely-observed Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model,
for several reasons:Default Risk Premia 23
1. Evaluation of the likelihood score requires a numerical diﬀerentiation of the
modeled EDF,












where EΘ denotes expectation associated with the parameter vector Θ.
2. As indicated by Kurbat and Korbalev (2002), Moody’s KMV caps its 1-year
EDF estimate at 20%. Since this truncation, if untreated, would bias our estima-
tor, we explicitly account for this censoring eﬀect on the associated conditional
likelihood, as explained in Appendix A.
3. Moody’s KMV also truncates the EDF below at 2 basis points. Moreover,
there is a signiﬁcant amount of integer-based granularity in EDF data below
approximately 10 basis points, as indicated in Figure 6. We therefore remove
from the sample any ﬁrm whose sample-mean EDF is below 10 basis points.
This leaves us with a sample of 84 ﬁrms.
4. There were occasional missing data points. These gaps were also treated exactly,
assuming that the event of censoring is independent of the underlying missing
observation, as explained in Appendix A.
5. For a small number of ﬁrms, an exceptional 1-month ﬂuctuation in the 1-year
EDF generated an obviously unrealistic estimate of the mean-reversion param-
eter κ for that company. We ignored Enron’s data point for December 2002,
the month it defaulted. Similarly, Magellan Health Services ﬁled for protection
under Chapter 11 in March 2003 (we used the EDFs through February 2003),
and Adelphia Communications petitioned for reorganization under Chapter 11
in June 2002 (we used the EDFs through May 2002). For Forest Oil, we ignored
the outlier months of January and February 1993. Finally, we removed DynergyDefault Risk Premia 24
from our data set as its 1-year EDF is capped at 20% for most of 2002 and 2003.
Table VII of Appendix A lists the ﬁrms for which we have EDF data, showing the
number of monthly observations for each as well as the number of EDF observations
that were truncated at 20%. The estimated parameter vector for each ﬁrm is provided
in Table XI, found in Appendix B. One notes signiﬁcant dispersion across ﬁrms in the
estimated parameters. Our Monte-Carlo analysis revealed substantial small-sample
bias in the MLE estimators. (See Table XII in Appendix B). We therefore obtain
sector-by-sector estimates for κ and σ, while allowing for a ﬁrm-speciﬁc long-run
mean parameter θ. Towards this end, we introduce a joint distribution of EDFs
across ﬁrms in a given industry sector by imposing joint normality of the Brownian
motions driving each ﬁrm’s EDFs, with a ﬂat cross-ﬁrm correlation structure within
the sector. In particular, we generalize Equation (4) by assuming that the logarithm
Xi
t = logλi





















where Bc and Bi are independent standard Brownian motions, independent of {Bj}j6=i,
and the constant pairwise within-sector correlation coeﬃcient ρ is an additional pa-




obtained from an EM algorithm with Gibbs sampling11 are shown in Table II and in
Table XIII in Appendix B. The intensity λ is measured in basis points per year.Default Risk Premia 25
Table II: Sector EDF-implied default intensity parameters. Asymptotic standard
errors, holding θi = ˆ θi constant, are in parenthesis.
ˆ κ ˆ σ ˆ ρ mean (ˆ θi) no. ﬁrms
Oil and Gas 0.469 1.224 0.282 3.110 40
(0.045) (0.040) (0.026) –
Healthcare 0.470 1.252 0.128 3.028 25
(0.054) (0.043) (0.018) –
Broadcasting & Entertainment 0.427 1.232 0.232 3.591 19
(0.068) (0.054) (0.027) –
V. Risk-Neutral Intensity from CDS and EDF
This section explains our methodology for estimating a joint model of actual and
risk-neutral default intensities from CDS and EDF data. The basic idea of the model
is that the risk-neutral default intensity of a given ﬁrm is a function of its own
default intensity, a measure of aggregate default risk in the sector, and a latent
variable that captures variation in default risk premia not already captured by the
ﬁrst two variables. Time-series variation in CDS rates, coupled with the behavior of
actual default intensities already estimated from the model described in the previous
section, is then used to estimate actual and risk-neutral dynamics, and to identify
the outcomes of the latent variables.
A. Default Swap Pricing
We begin with a simple reduced-form arbitrage-free pricing model for default swaps.
Under the absence of arbitrage and market frictions, and under mild technical con-
ditions, there exists a “risk-neutral” probability measure, also known as an “equiva-
lent martingale” measure, as shown by Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Delbaen and
Schachermayer (1999). In our setting, markets should not be assumed to be com-
plete, so the martingale measure is not unique. This pricing approach neverthelessDefault Risk Premia 26
allows us, under its conditions, to express the price at time t of a security paying














where r is the short-term interest-rate process12 and EQ denotes expectation with
respect to an equivalent martingale measure Q, that we ﬁx. One may view (6) as
the deﬁnition of such a measure Q. The idea is that the actual measure P and the
risk-neutral measure Q diﬀer by an adjustment for risk premia.
Under our earlier assumption of default timing according to a default intensity
process λ (under the actual probability measure P that generates our data), Artzner
and Delbaen (1992) show that there also exists a default intensity process λ∗ under
Q. Even though we have assumed the doubly-stochastic property under P, this
need not imply the same convenient doubly-stochastic property under Q as well.
Indeed, Kusuoka (1999) gave a counterexample. We will nevertheless assume the
doubly-stochastic property under Q. (Suﬃcient conditions are given in Duﬃe (2001),
Appendix N.) Thus, we have














provided the ﬁrm in question has survived to t.
For convenience, we assume independence, under Q, between interest rates on the
one hand, and on the other the default time τ and loss given default. We have veriﬁed
that, except for levels of volatility of r and λ∗ far in excess of those for our sample,
the role of risk-neutral correlation between interest rates and default risk is in any
case negligible for our parameters. This is not to suggest that the magnitude of the
correlation itself is negligible. (See, for example, Duﬀee (1998).) It follows from (6)
and this independence assumption that the price of a zero-coupon defaultable bondDefault Risk Premia 27
with maturity T and zero recovery at default is given by
d(t,T) = δ(t,T)p
∗(t,T), (8)








is the default-free market discount factor, and
p∗(t,T) is the risk-neutral conditional survival probability of (7). Extensions to the
case of correlated interest rates and default times were ﬁrst treated by Lando (1998).
A default swap stipulates quarterly payments by the buyer of protection at a
stipulated annual rate of c, as a fraction of notional, until the default-swap maturity
or default, whichever is ﬁrst. From (8), the market value of the payments by the









for payment dates t(1),...,t(n). The market value of the potential payment by the












where the payment W c












where bxc denotes the largest integer less than x, and where L∗
t denotes the risk-
neutral expected fractional loss of notional at time t, assuming immediate default.13
The second term in (11) is a deduction for accrued premium.
The current CDS rate is that choice C(t) for the premium rate c at which the
market values of the payments by the buyer and seller of protection are equal. ThatDefault Risk Premia 28
is, C(t) solves
C(t)g(t) = h(t,C(t)). (12)
Noting that h(t,c) is linear with respect to c, this is a linear equation to solve for
C(t).
We turn to the calculation of h(t,c). By the doubly-stochastic property (see, for
example, Duﬃe (2001), Chapter 11), we ﬁrst condition on (λ∗,L∗), and then use the
conditional risk-neutral density e−
R s









































which involves a time discretization of the integral in (13) that, in eﬀect, approxi-
mates between quarter ends with a linear discount function and risk-neutral survival
function. Then C(t) is calculated from (12) using this approximation. The discount
factors δ(t,s) are ﬁt from contemporaneous market LIBOR and swap rate data.
B. Model Speciﬁcation
We now specify a parametric model of the risk-neutral default intensity process λ∗,i
of any given ﬁrm i. Motivated in part by the success of our linear-in-logarithms
regressions reported in Section 3, we suppose that
logλ
∗,i
t = β0 + β1 logλ
i
t + β2 logvt + u
i
t, (15)Default Risk Premia 29
where β0,β1, and β2 are constants, Xi = logλi is as speciﬁed earlier by (5), and v
is the geometric average of default intensities {λi}i∈J, over a benchmark subset J of




















1 − ρu dξ
i
t, (17)
where θu, κu, and σu are constants, ρu is a constant correlation parameter, and where,
under the actual probability measure P, ξc and ξi are independent standard Brownian
motions, independent of the Brownian motions Bc and {Bj} of (5).
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1 − ρu d˜ ξ
i
t, (19)
where ˜ Bc, ˜ Bi, ˜ ξc, and ˜ ξi are independent standard Brownians motion under the risk-
neutral measure Q, independent of { ˜ Bj}j6=i and {˜ ξj}j6=i, and where ˜ θi, ˜ κ, and ˜ κu
are constants. In addition to the parameter vector Θ, the model for λ∗ requires anDefault Risk Premia 30
estimator of the parameter vector
Θ
∗ = (β0,β1,β2,{˜ θ
i},˜ κ,θu,κu,σu,ρu,˜ κu).
Since we have limited data with which to ﬁt the parameters in Θ∗, we impose the
over-identifying restriction that ˜ κ = κ and ˜ θi = θi − γ, where γ is a constant, the
same for all ﬁrms in the sector. This model is overly restrictive with respect to the
potential for diﬀerences between actual and risk-neutral dynamics. As a result, our
ability to disentangle the various contributions to default risk premia is limited.
C. Estimation Strategy and Results
For any given sector, we estimate the parameters (Θ,Θ∗) for the joint model of actual
and risk-neutral intensity processes in a two-step procedure. First, we estimate the
sector EDF-implied parameter vector Θ of the actual intensity model λ, following
the procedure described at the end of Section IV. We also compute the time series
of quarterly market discount factors δ by bootstrapping the U.S. dollar-denominated
LIBOR-quality swap yield curve using 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month LIBOR rates, and 2-, 3-,
4-, and 5-year swap yields that we obtain from Datastream. In a second step, treating
our estimate of Θ as though error-free, we estimate, sector by sector, the parameter
vector Θ∗ governing the risk-neutral intensity process λ∗. For this second step, our
data consist of weekly (Wednesday) observations of 1-year and 5-year default swap
rates and 1-year EDFs, from June 2000 through December 2004. As with the actual
default intensity model, this is not a routine MLE procedure since the evaluation of
the likelihood function requires a numerical diﬀerentiation of the modeled CDS rate
C(t) determined by (12), which we approximate using (14). At this point, we only
use transition between consecutive matched pairs of CDS-EDF observations for which
the EDF is not censored at 20%. This introduces a potential selection bias that weDefault Risk Premia 31
are currently investigating, but do not expect to be signiﬁcant.
We further break the estimation of the parameter vector Θ∗ into three parts,
in order to simplify the estimation procedure and to obtain more robust parameter
estimates. First, assuming that ui
t = 0, we determine β0, β1, β2, and γ so that
the sum of squared diﬀerences between the logarithm of the observed 1-year and 5-
year CDS rates and the logarithm of their model-implied counterparts is minimized.
Second, assuming that 5-year CDS rates are measured without error, we impose over-
identifying restrictions, in the form of moment conditions, by restricting Θ∗ so that
the model-implied stationary mean of exp(u) is 1, and so that the model-implied
stationary mean of u is equal to the model-implied sample mean across all ﬁrms in
a given sector. This improves the interpretability of the parameter estimates, and
facilitates comparison of the implied values for λ and λ∗. We also choose σu and ˜ κu
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are close (in terms of mean squared diﬀerences) to 0 and 1, respectively. Finally, we
ﬁnd ρu so that the sector log-likelihood, using all previously determined parameters,
is maximized. In all cases, λ and λ∗ are measured in basis points per year. We
assume that the risk-neutral mean loss given default L∗ is 75% on average, across
the three industries used in our study, and that the sector-speciﬁc levels of L∗ are
proportionally adjusted by the sector-speciﬁc average recoveries reported in Footnote
8.
Sector-by-sector parameter estimates for the oil-and-gas, healthcare, and broadcasting-
and-entertainment industry are summarized in Table III, and sector-by-sector sample
moments of the estimated risk premia, that is, the ratio of estimated risk-neutral toDefault Risk Premia 32
Table III: Sector CDS-implied risk-neutral default intensity parameter estimates
parameter Oil and Gas Healthcare Broadcasting and
estimates Entertainment
ˆ β0 0.829 0.576 -2.685
ˆ β1 0.537 0.522 0.400
ˆ β2 0.707 0.628 1.594
ˆ γ 0.563 -0.175 -0.421
ˆ θu -0.645 -0.258 -0.283
ˆ κu 0.290 0.197 0.248
ˆ σu 0.864 0.451 0.530
ˆ ρu 0.335 0.212 0.479
ˆ ˜ κu 0.131 -0.200 -0.233
sector likelihood 0.851 1.436 1.388
L∗ 0.646 0.836 0.768
no. ﬁrms 33 16 13
estimated actual default intensities, are provided in Table IV. Summary statistics by
ﬁrm are listed in Table XIV, Appendix B.
As an illustrative example, Figure 8 displays the estimated ratio of risk-neutral to
actual default probability for Disney, for each of several maturities. For the “instan-
taneous” maturity, this is the estimated jump-to-default risk premia, that is, the ratio
of λ∗ to λ. (The one-year risk-neutral and actual default probabilities are themselves
individually plotted in Figure 1.) Figure 9 shows the observed 5-year CDS rates of
Disney, as well as the contemporaneous CDS rates that would have been estimated
by our model in the absence of any risk premia. Figure 9 also shows the CDS rates
that would have applied in the absence of risk premia associated with non-default
mark-to-market risk, that is, assuming no market price of risk associated with ran-
dom ﬂuctuations in the risk-neutral intensity processes, and taking all risk premia to
be those associated with jump to default risk. (This is equivalent to artiﬁcially taking
the risk-neutral distribution λ∗ to be equal to the estimated empirical distribution of
λ∗.)
Jarrow, Lando, and Yu (2005) provide conditions under which there are no jump-
to-default risk premia (λ = λ∗). A suﬃcient condition, for example, is that thereDefault Risk Premia 33




mean median min max 1st quartile 3rd quartile
Oil and Gas 3.303 2.539 0.204 21.128 1.263 4.490
Healthcare 2.168 1.853 0.603 8.975 1.346 2.640
Broadcast.-E. 2.037 1.497 0.124 12.794 0.723 2.787
All 2.757 2.032 0.124 21.128 1.121 3.554
are inﬁnitely many ﬁrms exposed to the same risk factors as the ﬁrm in question, all
defaulting independently conditional on those risk factors. If λ∗ = λ, then default risk
premia are entirely due to the market price of risk for uncertainty in the adjustment
of λ∗ over time. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Hugonnier (2004) provide a the-
ory for jump-to-default risk premia, based on a form of contagion. Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein, and Helwege (2004) provide some related empirical evidence. Even with-
out contagion, jump-to-default risk premia can be large if it is diﬃcult to hedge the
risk associated with the timing of default, and loss given default, of a particular ﬁrm
(except of course by directly transferring those risks to another investor). Given our
assumption that the 1-year CDS rate is measured with noise, and given the relatively
short time horizon that we use to estimate the market prices of risk associated with
the Brownian motions driving risk-neutral intensities, we do not claim accuracy for
our estimated decomposition of CDS risk premia into the portion due to jump-to-
default risk (diﬀerences between λ∗ and λ) and that due to the market prices of risk
of factors driving changes over time in λ∗.
Consistent with the presence of market prices of risk associated with ﬂuctua-
tions in λ∗, these multiplicative risk premia shown in Figure 8 are generally larger
for longer maturities. This term eﬀect, associated with aversion to mark-to-market
risk associated with changes in credit spreads, apparently dominates, empirically, a
countervailing “convexity eﬀect.”15
For example, extracting from Table III the ﬁt implied for the healthcare sector,Default Risk Premia 34

























































Figure 8: Estimated ratio of risk-neutral to actual default probabilities for Disney, by maturity.











































Figure 9: Disney: 5-year actual (market) CDS rates, and modeled CDS rates in the absence of














where λt and λ∗
t are measured in basis points per year. So, for an actual default
intensity of 100 basis points, a geometric average of all default intensities in the
sector of 100 basis points, and ut = 0, we get a risk-neutral default intensity of
roughly 355 basis points. If the actual default intensity λi
t of ﬁrm i increases by 1%,
then, everything else being equal, the risk-neutral default intensity λ∗,i is estimated
to increase by roughly β1%. Similarly, if the default intensities for each ﬁrm in the
sector increase by 1%, λ∗,i increases by roughly (β1+β2)%. The estimated risk-neutral
distributions of λ and u are implied by the estimated model,
dlogλt = 0.421((ˆ θ
i + 0.175) − logλt)dt + 1.231d ˜ Bt,
dlogut = −0.200ut dt + 0.451d˜ ξt,
where ˆ θi is reported in Table XI, Appendix B. The sample averages of the estimated
jump-to-default risk premia (that is, λ∗/λ) are 3.30, 2.17, and 2.04 for the oil-and-
gas, healthcare, and broadcasting-and-entertainment sector, respectively. Additional
sector-by-sector sample statistics of the estimated jump-to-default risk premia are
provided in Table IV.
As a diagnostic check, we examine the behavior of the standardized innovations
￿t+h,￿t+2h,... of ut, deﬁned in (20). Under the speciﬁed model, and under the actual
probability measure P, these innovations are standard normals. Table V lists theDefault Risk Premia 36
Table V: Sample moments for standardized innovations
Mean SD
Oil and Gas -0.034 0.982
Healthcare -0.046 0.938
Broadcasting and Entertainment -0.034 0.989
All -0.037 0.975
sample mean and the sample standard deviation (SD) of the ﬁtted versions of these
standardized innovations, for each of the three sectors. Figure 10 shows the associated
histogram of ﬁtted ￿t, merging across all ﬁrms, plotted against the standard normal
density curve. The innovations are relatively symmetrically distributed and somewhat
leptokurtic.
Bearing in mind that our CDS rate observations are likely to be rather “noisy”
relative to what actual market transaction rates would have been, as explained in
Section 2, we undertook as a further robustness check an analysis of the implications of
assuming that even the 5-year CDS rate is measured with error. This requires a ﬁlter
for the underlying state variable ui
t that, along with the observed EDF, determines
what the “true” CDS would be. For this purpose, we assumed that the measurement
noise of the CDS rate is such that the implied measurement noise for ui
t is normally
distributed, and iid. With this, because ui
t is modeled as an auto-regressive Gaussian
process, Kalman ﬁltering applies. Some details of the main model were modiﬁed in
order to make estimation tractable in the presence of ﬁltering.16 Even so, this is
not a simple procedure. (Details can be provided upon request.) Sector-by-sector
maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for this model speciﬁcation are provided in
Table XV in the appendix. For the healthcare and oil-and-gas sectors, the estimated
standard deviations of the measurement noise are approximately 5.5% and 5.8%,
respectively. (These translate into roughly similar proportional levels of measurement
noise for the associated CDS rates.) We do not yet have reliable measurement-noise
results for the broadcasting-and-entertainment sector. Observed CDS rates do seemDefault Risk Premia 37



















Figure 10: Estimated innovations ￿ across all sectors, and
the standard normal density.
to best track sector-wide default risk in the broadcasting-and-entertainment sector.17
Measurement noise, when not treated in a simple autoregressive time-series model,
causes an upward bias in estimated mean reversion coeﬃcients. (For example, given
an unusually large outcome of the current period’s measurement noise, the subsequent
period’s measurement noise, being independent, has conditional mean zero, inducing
an “extra” source of mean reversion in the observed time series.) Incorporating
measurement noise into our model speciﬁcation indeed caused large reductions in the
estimated rates of mean reversion of ui in the modiﬁed model, for both the healthcare
and oil-and-gas sectors. In terms of the magnitudes and time variation of default risk
premia, however, the broad characterizations that we draw on the basis of our main
model are not dramatically aﬀected.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
We have uncovered substantial time variation in the compensation to investors for
bearing U.S. corporate default risk. This section discusses some alternative explana-Default Risk Premia 38
tions for the time variation in default risk premia uncovered in our panel regression
and time-series analyses. We will brieﬂy explore three potential inﬂuences:
• Mismeasurement of actual conditional default probabilities.
• Time variation in risk-neutral conditional expectation of loss given default.
• Changes in the supply of and demand for risk bearing, whose eﬀects are exag-
gerated by some limits on the mobility of capital across segments of the capital
markets.
• The impact of principal-agency ineﬃciencies in the asset management industry.
We discuss these in order.
By construction, EDFs are unbiased estimates of default rates on average over
their in-sample period. Suppose, however, that, like ratings, Moody’s KMV EDFs
are “too smooth” over time, so that they are biased downward when true conditional
default probabilities are high, and biased upward when true conditional default prob-
abilities are low. (In fact, Table II shows substantial annualized volatility, about
122%, for the default intensities implied by EDFs, belying the idea that EDFs vary
little over time.) If EDFs were excessively smooth over time, then our estimated de-
fault risk premia would vary more dramatically than would actual default risk premia.
Bohn, Arora, and Korablev (2005) report (in their Section 4.4) that EDFs did indeed
predict “too many” defaults in 2003, a year in which we estimate declining default
risk premia, as CDS rates came down faster than EDFs. For example, they estimate
that the model that produces Moody’s KMV EDFs would have placed a probability
of only 27.3% on the event that there would have been as few or fewer defaults in 2003
by ﬁrms in their study sample than the actual number of defaults.18 If credit market
participants had assigned lower default probabilities than the associated EDFs, then
actual default risk premia for 2003 would be higher than those that we have esti-
mated. On the other hand, the low number of realized defaults for 2003 could simplyDefault Risk Premia 39
have been a surprise (to anyone with accurate probability assignments). We are not
aware, in any case, that marginal investors in corporate debt had access to better
default probability estimates than those supplied by Moody’s KMV, but of course
this is hard to verify. For the other years in our sample, the incidence of defaults was
not especially “surprising” in this sense, relative to the EDF-predicted number of de-
faults. Bohn, Arora, and Korablev (2005) estimate the associated p-values for 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 at 46.1%, 61.8%, 47.9%, 27.3%, and 54.4%, respectively.
In particular, the “ex-post” p-values for 2002 and 2004 are similar, but our estimated
default risk premia are substantially higher in 2002 than in 2004. While our ﬁnding
that default risk premia varied signiﬁcantly during our sample period could be at least
in part an artifact of mismeasured default probabilities, it is also not easy to make
a strong case that EDFs were biased relative to the conditional default probabilities
assigned by credit-market participants, time by time, in a manner that would largely
explain our results.
A weakness of the methodology that we used to measure default risk premia
is that it ignores correlation between the loss given default ` of an issuer and the
default time τ. From Moody’s data covering default and default recoveries for all
rated corporate debt from 1980 through 2004, a regression of cross-sectional average
default recovery rate Y on the average default rate X provides the OLS estimated
model Y = 0.57 − 0.076X, with an R2 of 0.46, showing a highly signiﬁcant and eco-
nomically important negative relationship, in the aggregate, in recovery and default
rates. Further analysis of this relationship is provided by Altman, Brady, Resti, and
Sironi (2003). It might therefore be appropriate to assume that, for a given issuer,
the LGD ` and the indicator of default before maturity, 1τ<T, are positively corre-
lated, risk-neutrally. If so, then our modeled CDS rates would be too low, for the
risk-neutral mean default loss EQ(1τ<T`) is in that case larger than the product of
Q(τ < T) = EQ(1τ<T) and the risk-neutral mean LGD, L∗ = EQ(`). There areDefault Risk Premia 40
currently no reliable data bearing on the magnitude of this eﬀect. If this covariance
eﬀect is constant, one could scale the average eﬀect of this covariance into the param-
eter assumed for the risk-neutral mean LGD. While the measured default risk premia
could be biased from this eﬀect, it does not necessarily follow that this correlation
eﬀect has a major impact on relative default risk premia at diﬀerent times.
On the other hand, one might worry that the upward impact of this correlation on
CDS rates is not constant over time, but greatest when default risk is highest, which
could lead to an overstatement by our model (which ignores LGD-default correlation)
of the time variation of default risk premia. For example, consider the extreme case
in which there are no default risk premia (that is, Q = P). Suppose that, as we have
found empirically, a default intensity λt is persistent over time. Let Wt denote the
recovery that would occur in the event of default at time t. That is, ` = 1 − Wτ.
Suppose that Wt = f(λt,￿), where ￿ is independent of the path of λ, and f(x,y) is
decreasing in x. Then, given persistence in λt, the conditional expectation Et(1−Wτ)
of the LGD that will occur at the default time τ is increasing in the current intensity
λt. The ratio of CDS rates to default probabilities would then be time-varying, and
higher when CDS rates are higher. A model that ignores LGD-default correlation
would misinterpret this as time variation in default risk premia.
Based on Moody’s data for 1980 to 2004,19 Figure 11 shows the sample correlation
between aggregate default rates in year t and average senior-unsecured debt recovery
rates K years later, as the lag K ranges from 0 (contemporaneous) to 5 years, the
maturity of our benchmark default swaps. Now, conditional on a default within the
5-year maturity, except for very low-quality ﬁrms, the expected time to default is
roughly 2.5 years.20 At least based on the data underlying this ﬁgure, there is no
obvious reason to conclude that the LGD-default correlation eﬀect on 5-year CDS
rates is large. That said, there are almost no data bearing on the risk-neutral (as
opposed to actual) LGD-default correlation, which would be needed to deduce theDefault Risk Premia 41
Figure 11: Correlation between default rate at year t and recovery rate at year t+K, for 1980-2004.
Data from Moody’s (2005).
impact of recovery risk on CDS rates.
In order to gauge the general magnitude of the eﬀect of risk-neutral LGD-default
correlation on CDS rates, we calculate the pricing impact in a simple example. Sup-
pose, given the current risk-neutral intensity λ∗
t, that any default recovery Wt that
occurs at time t is beta distributed21 with mean M(λ∗
t) and standard deviation
0.2 − 0.4|0.5 − M(λ∗
t)|. We assume a log-normal risk-neutral default intensity (as
in our model), but for simplicity assume a 50% risk-neutral mean-reversion rate and
100% volatility. We set M(λ∗
t) = ea−bλ∗
t, where a and b are chosen for an unconditional
risk-neutral mean LGD of 0.5 and a risk-neutral correlation of −0.5 between W2.5 and
λ∗
2.5. (Again, 2.5 years is roughly the time horizon that matters for 5-year CDS, if
one is to pick a particular time horizon.) At these parameters, an increase in default
intensity from 200 basis points to 1000 basis points reduces current risk-neutral mean
recovery from 50% to 25%. This is roughly the speculative-grade empirical experi-
ence from 1998 to 2001, a period during which average default recovery sank to an
extremely low level, relative to history. Even before considering idiosyncratic recovery
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substantial amount of LGD-default correlation, relative to our sample, most of which
is of investment-grade quality. Moving the risk-neutral intensity-LGD correlation
from 0 (the assumption in our CDS model) to 0.5 increases 5-year CDS rates from
100 basis points to about 118 basis points. This means that the risk-neutral default
probability that would be inferred by a model assuming no LGD-default correlation,
at an observed CDS rate of 118 basis points would be biased about 18% too high.
This bias would always be positive, but would (under our distributional assumptions)
be proportionately greater when CDS rates are high than when they are low. Such
a bias is likely to be responsible for some of the measured variation in default risk
premia reported in this paper. To repeat, whether the magnitude of the bias is large
is diﬃcult to judge because there are essentially no empirical data bearing directly
on risk-neutral LGD-default correlation.
A third explanation for the large time variation in estimated default risk premia
that we have uncovered in this paper may be based on the usual market-equilibrium
suspect: variations over time in the supply of, and demand for, risk bearing, po-
tentially exacerbated by limited mobility of capital across diﬀerent classes of asset
markets. Along the lines of the explanation suggested by Froot and O’Connell (1999)
for time variation in catastrophe insurance risk premia, capital moves into and out
of the market for corporate credit in response to ﬂuctuations in risk premia, but per-
haps not instantaneously so. Generally, when there are large losses or large increases
in risk in a particular market segment, if capital does not move immediately out of
other asset markets and into that segment, then risk premia would tend to adjust so
as to match the demand for capital with the supply of capital that is available to the
sector. Investors or asset managers with available capital take time to be found by
intermediaries, to be convinced (perhaps being unfamiliar with the particular asset
class) of the available risk premia, and to exit from the markets in which they are
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(1999) show that this process can take well over a year, in terms of the half-life of the
mean reversion of risk premia to long-run levels. Similar explanations, albeit with
shorter half-lives, have been oﬀered by Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007)
for variation of prepayment risk premia in the market for mortgage-backed securities,
and by Greenwood (2005) for the price impact of supply shocks in equity markets.
In order to explore the role of limited capital mobility in determining credit risk
premia, we replaced the time and sector dummies in the panel-regression (2) with
current stock-market volatility V (in percent), as measured by VIX (an index of
option-implied volatility of the S-and-P 500), and with the total face value D of U.S.
defaulted corporate debt over the prior 6 months, measured in billions of U.S. dollars.
(The defaulted debt data were provided by Moody’s.) As market volatility goes up, a
given level of capital available to bear risk represents less and less capital per unit of
risk to be borne. If replacement capital does not move into the corporate debt sector
immediately, the supply and demand for risk capital will match at a higher price per
unit of risk. (This eﬀect would be present even with perfect capital mobility, but the
magnitude of the eﬀect is increased with partially segmented markets.) Similarly, a
loss of capital through trailing defaulted debt, proxied by D, reduces the amount of
capital available to bear risk. The ﬁtted model and “robust” standard errors (shown
parenthetically) are
logCDSi = 1.08 + 0.84 logEDFi + 1.18D + 0.011V + zi, (21)
(0.015) (0.003) (0.57) (0.00049)
where zi is the residual. The associated R2 is 0.71. The coeﬃcients for trailing
defaulted debt and VIX are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional conﬁdence levels,
particularly so for VIX, whose coeﬃcient has a t-statistic of over 22. The EDF-
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default risk through an estimate of the contemporaneous volatility of each ﬁrm, so
the estimated eﬀect of a change in VIX on CDS rates is on top of that implied by
the impact of a change in market volatility on estimated default probabilities.22 (It
is of course possible that volatility is not well estimated in the Moody’s KMV EDF
model.) The estimated coeﬃcient for VIX implies that the reduction in S-and-P
500 volatility that occurred between August 2002 and the end of 2003, from 45% to
about 11%, is associated with a proportional reduction of about 44% in the credit
default swap rates assigned by the market at a given default probability. This is
plausible, in that the time ﬁxed eﬀects associated with (2) are, on average across
the three sectors, of similar magnitude. The role of trailing defaulted debt, while
statistically signiﬁcant, is somewhat less pronounced in magnitude. In July 2002, for
example, trailing-6-month corporate debt increased over that of the previous month
by 3.4 billion dollars, which is responsible for an estimated proportional increase in
credit spreads of approximately 4%, holding all else equal. On the other hand, if the
EDF model is imperfect, a change in trailing defaulted debt could proxy for a change
in average default probabilities not captured by the EDF model. We cannot rule
this out. In light of the rather adverse market conditions of mid 2002, a behavioral
reaction by some market participants also cannot be ruled out.
On top of these eﬀects, money managers may have been reluctant to place them-
selves in “harm’s way,” in terms of adverse inference by investors regarding the ability
or eﬀorts of asset managers in light of prior losses through default. This principal-
agency eﬀect may have reduced their willingness to load up on corporate credit risk,
despite the high risk premia oﬀered. A related principal-agency explanation of declin-
ing risk premia during 2002-2004 is the propensity for ﬁxed-income asset managers
to “reach for yield” when treasury market rates decline, as they did during 2002-
2004. That is, in order to oﬀer their supposedly unsophisticated or poorly informed
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money managers are willing to take increasing credit risk for the same yield. While
reaching for yield is frequently mentioned anecdotally, we have no speciﬁc evidence
of its prevalence.
Yet another interpretation of the estimated role of market-wide volatility and
trailing defaulted debt is that these variables are proxies for an increase in default
correlation, for which we have not controlled. Variation over time in conditional
default correlation can be responsible for increases or reductions in the degree of
diversiﬁcation available in the corporate bond market, and therefore could change
default risk premia. Capital immobility would magnify any such eﬀect.
Consistent with our conjecture that variation in default risk premia are partly
caused by sluggish movement in risk capital across sectors, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein,
and Martin (2001) earlier showed that VIX is an important explanatory variable for
changes in credit spreads, after controlling, ﬁrm by ﬁrm, with equity returns. They
did not pin down an explanation for the role of VIX. For diﬀerent data, the same
important role of VIX was conﬁrmed by Schafer and Strebulaev (2008). Notably,
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) emphasize, and Avramov, Jostova,
and Philipov (2004), Schafer and Strebulaev (2008), and Yu (2006) conﬁrm, that
a large fraction of the variation in a ﬁrm’s credit spreads is not explained by the
same ﬁrm’s equity returns. From the theoretical view that debt and equity can be
treated as derivatives written on the total market value of the underlying ﬁrm, per-
fect capital mobility between equity and debt markets would tend to lead debt and
equity returns to have strong common components, contrary to the results of these
studies. Consistent with our conjecture that there may be risk premia in the cor-
porate debt sector that are due to temporary ﬂuctuations in the availability of risk
capital due to partially segmented markets, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin
(2001) ﬁnd statistical evidence of a further common factor in corporate bond returns,
above and beyond equity returns, risk-free yields, and VIX, whose source was unex-Default Risk Premia 46
Table VI: Five-year default risk premium implied by the structural-model results of
Huang and Huang (2003)
Initial Premium Q(τ < 5) P(τ < 5)
Rating (ratio) (percent) (percent)
Aaa 1.7497 0.04 0.02
Aa 1.7947 0.09 0.05
A 1.7322 0.25 0.15
Baa 1.4418 1.22 0.84
Ba 1.1658 9.11 7.85
B 1.1058 25.61 23.41
plained. Although Avramov, Jostova, and Philipov (2004) do not ﬁnd support for
this “mysterious common factor,” Saita (2005) does.
The market did indeed respond over time to opportunities for insuring default risk.
Open interest in the default swap market has roughly doubled in each year for the
last several years. Investment banks and broker dealers in corporate credit markets
have increased their credit-derivatives staﬀs and market-making capacity signiﬁcantly.
Among hedge funds that were newly established during the period 2002-2004, those
specializing in corporate credit risk were by far the most prevalent.
Our results on the average magnitude of default risk premia are comparable to
those available in the prior literature. Using the structural model of Leland and Toft
(1996), Huang and Huang (2003) calibrated parameters for the model determining
actual and risk-neutral default probabilities, by credit rating, that are implied from
equity-market risk premia, recoveries, initial leverage ratios, and average default fre-
quencies. All underlying parameters were obtained from averages reported by the
credit rating agencies, Moody’s and Standard and Poors, except for the equity-market
risk premia, which were obtained by rating from estimates by Bhandari (1999). At
the ﬁve-year maturity point, our calculation of the associated estimated ratios of an-
nualized risk-neutral to actual ﬁve-year default probabilities are reported in Table VI.
In magnitude, the results are also roughly consistent with those of Driessen (2005).
In both of these prior studies, risk premia are proportionately higher for highly-ratedDefault Risk Premia 47
ﬁrms, consistent with the results of our panel-regression model and time-series anal-
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Appendices
A. MLE for Intensity from EDFs
This appendix shows our methodology for MLE estimation of the parameters of the
default intensity, including the eﬀects of missing EDF data as well as censoring of
EDFs by truncation from above at 20%. Our data is the monthly observed EDF level
Yi at month i, for each of N + 1 month-end times t0,t1,...,tN.
From (4), for any time t and time step h (which is 1/12 in our application), the
discretely sampled log-intensity process X satisﬁes
Xt+h = b0 + b1Xt + ￿t+h, (A.1)
where b1 = e−κh, b0 = θ(1−b1), and ￿t+h,￿t+2h,... are iid normal with mean zero and
variance σ￿ = σ2(1 − e−2κh)/(2κ).
For a given ﬁrm, we initialize the search for the parameter vector Θ = (θ,κ,σ) as
follows. First, we regress log(Yi) on log(Yi−1), using only months at which both the
current and the lagged EDF are observed and not truncated at 20%. The associated
regression coeﬃcient estimates, denoted by ˆ b0 and ˆ b1, are considered to be starting
estimates of b0 and b1, respectively. The sample standard deviation of the ﬁtted
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If Θ is the true parameter vector, then Yi = G(λ(ti);Θ), where G is deﬁned via (5).
Suppose, to pick an example of a censoring outcome from which the general case
can easily be deduced, that for months k + 1 through ¯ k ≥ k + 1, inclusive, the EDFs
are truncated at ζ = 20%, meaning that the censored and observed EDF is 20%,
implying that the actual EDF was larger than or equal to 20%, and moreover that
the EDF data from month l + 1 > ¯ k + 1 to month ¯ l are missing. Let I = {i : k+1 ≤
i ≤ ¯ k} ∪ {i : l + 1 ≤ i ≤ ¯ l} denote the censored and missing month numbers. Then
the likelihood of the observed non-censored EDFs Y = {Yi : i 6∈ I} evaluated at





P(Yn+1 ∈ dyn+1;Yn = yn,Θ)




P(Yn+1 ∈ dyn+1;Yn = yn,Θ)




P(Yn+1 ∈ dyn+1;Yn = yn,Θ),
where P(·;Yn = yn;Θ) denotes the distribution of {Yn+1,Yn+2,...} associated with
initial condition yn for Yn, and associated with parameter vector Θ. A maximum




For z ∈ R, we let g(z;Θ) = G(ez;Θ), and let ZΘ
i = g−1(Yi;Θ) denote the logarithm
of the default intensity at time ti that would be implied by a non-censored EDF
observation Yi, assuming the true parameter vector is Θ. Letting Dg(·;Θ) denoteDefault Risk Premia 50
the partial derivative of g(·;Θ) with respect to its ﬁrst argument, and using standard






























































The second term on the right-hand side of (A.3) is equal to












¯ k+1 = g
−1(y¯ k+1;Θ),Θ).
In the remainder of this appendix, we describe how to compute q(Y ;Θ) by Monte
Carlo integration, and hence P(Yk+1 ≥ ζ,...,Y¯ k ≥ ζ;Yk = yk,Y¯ k+1 = y¯ k+1,Θ). In
order to simplify notation we suppress Θ in what follows. We observe that for any
time t between times s and u, the conditional distribution of X(t) given X(s) and
X(u) is a normal distribution with mean M(t|s,u) and variance V (t|s,u) given by
M(t|s,u) =
1 − e−2κ(u−t)
1 − e−2κ(u−s)M(t|s) +
e−2κ(u−t) − e−2κ(u−s)
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where, for times t before u, we let








κ(u−t)(X(u) − θ(1 − e
−κ(u−t)))
denote the conditional expectation and variance, respectively, of X(u) given X(t), and
the conditional expectation of X(t) given X(u). As a consequence, letting Zk = X(tk),
we can easily simulate from the joint conditional distribution of (Zk+1,...,Z¯ k) given
Zk and Z¯ k+1, which is given by





We are now in a position to estimate the quantity in (A.4) by generating some “large”




¯ k);1 ≤ j ≤ J} from the
joint conditional distribution of (Zk+1,...,Z¯ k) given Zk and Z¯ k+1, and by computing
the fraction of those paths for which Z
j
i ≥ g−1(ζ) for all i in {k + 1,...,¯ k}.Default Risk Premia 52
Table VII: Number of observations of 1-year EDFs. Data: Moody’s KMV.
Ticker sector† not capped at total Ticker sector not capped at total
censored 0.02% 20% censored 0.02% 20%
253647Q B&E 55 18 0 73 IPG B&E 119 1 0 120
ABC H 113 0 0 113 JNJ H 26 118 0 144
ABT H 82 62 0 144 KMG O&G 123 21 0 144
ADELQ B&E 97 0 16 113 KMI O&G 142 2 0 144
AGN H 126 18 0 144 KMP O&G 139 3 0 142
AHC O&G 137 7 0 144 KRI B&E 70 50 0 120
AMGN H 36 108 0 144 L B&E 81 21 0 102
APA O&G 144 0 0 144 LH H 120 0 0 120
APC O&G 144 0 0 144 LLY H 101 43 0 144
BAX H 144 0 0 144 MCCC B&E 56 0 0 56
BC B&E 120 0 0 120 MDT H 39 105 0 144
BEV H 142 0 2 144 MGLH H 103 0 19 122
BHI O&G 144 0 0 144 MMM H 42 78 0 120
BJS O&G 144 0 0 144 MRK H 50 70 0 120
BLC B&E 115 5 0 120 MRO O&G 144 0 0 144
BMY H 54 90 0 144 NBR O&G 144 0 0 144
BR O&G 129 15 0 144 NEV O&G 137 0 0 137
BSX H 123 21 0 144 NOI O&G 97 0 0 97
CAH H 144 0 0 144 OCR H 131 13 0 144
CAM O&G 113 0 0 113 OEI O&G 124 0 0 124
CCU B&E 142 2 0 144 OMC B&E 120 0 0 120
CHIR H 144 0 0 144 OXY O&G 132 12 0 144
CHK O&G 130 0 13 143 PDE O&G 144 0 0 144
CHTR B&E 50 0 11 61 PFE H 36 84 0 120
CMCSA B&E 144 0 0 144 PHA H 77 23 0 100
CNG U 72 13 0 85 PKD O&G 144 0 0 144
COC O&G 45 0 0 45 PRM B&E 107 0 3 110
COP O&G 133 11 0 144 PXD O&G 144 0 0 144
COX B&E 116 0 0 116 RCL B&E 141 0 0 141
CVX O&G 39 105 0 144 RIG O&G 136 4 0 140
CYH H 97 0 0 97 SBGI B&E 113 0 0 113
DCX A 68 6 0 74 SGP H 61 59 0 120
DGX H 93 0 0 93 SLB O&G 85 35 0 120
DIS B&E 103 41 0 144 SUN O&G 120 0 0 120
DO O&G 97 10 0 107 THC H 144 0 0 144
DVN O&G 135 9 0 144 TLM O&G 126 18 0 144
DYN U 121 0 13 134 TRI H 67 0 0 67
EEP O&G 114 6 0 120 TSG B&E 94 3 0 97
ENRNQ O&G 105 1 1 107 TSO O&G 135 0 0 135
EP O&G 143 0 1 144 TWX B&E 144 0 0 144
EPD O&G 76 0 0 76 UCL O&G 117 3 0 120
F A 143 1 0 144 UHS H 120 0 0 120
FST O&G 142 0 0 142 UNH H 113 7 0 120
GDT H 115 2 0 117 VIA B&E 139 5 0 144
GENZ H 144 0 0 144 VLO O&G 144 0 0 144
GLM O&G 120 0 0 120 VPI O&G 144 0 0 144
GM A 144 0 0 144 WFT O&G 143 1 0 144
HAL O&G 144 0 0 144 WLP H 137 7 0 144
HCA H 140 4 0 144 WMB U 135 1 8 144
HCR H 120 0 0 120 WYE H 86 58 0 144
HMA H 95 25 0 120 XOM O&G 0 120 0 120
HRC H 131 0 4 135 XTO O&G 120 0 0 120
HUM H 142 0 0 142 YBTVA B&E 120 0 0 120
ICCI T 65 0 0 65
† A: Automobile; B&E: Broadcasting and Entertainment; H: Healthcare; O&G: Oil and Gas; R: Retail; T: Trans-
portation; U: Utilities.Default Risk Premia 53
B. Additional Background Statistics
This appendix contains additional background statistics regarding the ﬁrms studied.
Section II contains the data regarding ﬁrms from the broadcasting-and-entertainment
industry. This appendix includes information regarding the ﬁrms studied from the
healthcare and the oil-and-gas industries.
Table VIII: Healthcare ﬁrms
Firm Name Median EDF Median Rating No. Quotes
Abbott Laboratories 4.0 A1 1,845
Allergan Inc 3.0 A3 2,137
Amerisource Bergen Corp 83.5 Ba3 437
Amgen Inc 2.0 A2 2,159
Baxter International Inc 32.0 Baa1 2,252
Beverly Enterprises Inc 1,086.0 B1 285
Boston Scientiﬁc Corp 5.0 Baa1 1,813
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co 22.0 A1 2,063
Cardinal Health Inc 15.0 Baa3 1,753
Chiron Corp 12.0 Baa2 1,920
Community Health Systems Inc 98.0 N/A 307
Eli Lilly & Co 3.0 Aa3 1,942
Genzyme Corp 24.0 N/A 1,657
Guidant Corp 5.0 Baa1 1,407
HCA Inc 23.0 Ba2 891
Health Management Associates Inc 10.0 N/A 2,222
Healthsouth Corp – N/A 318
Humana Inc 40.0 Baa3 1,925
Johnson & Johnson 2.0 Aaa 1,654
Laboratory Corp Of America Holdings 12.0 Baa3 1,635
Manor Care Inc 21.0 Baa3 1,168
Medtronic Inc 2.0 N/A 2,093
Merck & Co Inc 5.0 Aa2 1,516
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co (3M) 2.0 Aa1 1,655
Pﬁzer Inc 2.0 Aaa 1,504
Pharmacia Corporation 9.0 Aaa 1,116
Quest Diagnostics 10.0 Baa2 1,230
Schering-Plough Corporation 25.0 Baa1 1,658
Tenet Healthcare Corporation 67.0 B3 –
Triad Hospitals Inc 148.0 B2 519
United Health Group Inc 2.0 A3 1,442
Universal Health Services Inc 33.5 Baa3 1,237
Wellpoint Health Networks – Baa1 1,580
Wyeth 17.0 Baa1 2,150Default Risk Premia 54
Table IX: Oil and gas ﬁrms
Firm Name Median EDF Median Rating No. Quotes
Amerada Hess Corp 20.0 Ba1 1,284
Anadarko Petroleum Corp 43.0 Baa1 2,696
Apache Corp 11.0 A3 2,217
Baker Hughes Inc 15.0 A2 2,207
BJ Services Co 17.0 Baa2 1,588
BurlingtonResourcesInc 10.0 Baa1 2,056
Chesapeake Energy Corp 177.0 Ba3 1,152
Chevron Texaco Corp 3.0 N/A 1,897
Conoco Phillips Holding Co 15.5 A3 1,677
Cooper Cameron Corp 29.0 Baa1 1,518
XTO Energy Inc 6.0 Baa3 1,225
Diamond Oﬀshore Drilling 25.0 Baa2 2,331
EL Paso Corp 1,000.0 Caa1 2,294
Exxon Mobil Corp 2.0 N/A 1,329
Forest Oil Corp 107.0 Ba3 367
Global Marine Inc 12.0 Baa1 1,401
Halliburton Co 86.0 Baa2 2,139
Kerr-Mc Gee Corp 38.0 Baa3 2,170
Kinder Morgan Energy Partners LP 12.0 Baa1 2,263
Kinder Morgan Inc 7.0 Baa2 2,003
National-Oilwell Inc 31.0 Baa2 1,201
Occidental Petroleum Corp 8.0 Baa1 2,581
Parker Drilling Co 446.5 B2 449
Conoco Phillips 6.0 A3 2,929
Pioneer Natural Resources Co 44.0 Baa3 1,001
Pride International Inc 113.5 Ba2 1,228
Shell Oil Co – Aa2 1,373
Sunoco Inc 7.5 Baa2 1,536
Talisman Energy Inc 5.0 N/A 1,425
Transocean Inc 71.5 Baa2 2,487
Unocal Corp 6.0 Baa2 1,441
Marathon Oil Corp 10.0 Baa1 2,024
Valero Energy Corp 35.5 Baa3 2,637
Vintage Petroleum Inc 229.0 Ba3 556
Weatherford International Ltd 35.0 Baa1 2,874
Enron Corp 51.5 WR 361
Devon Energy Corporation 19.0 Baa2 2,878
Enterprise Products Partners LP 5.0 N/A 1,439
Enbridge Energy Partners LP 6.0 N/A 1,192
Nabors Industries Ltd 41.0 N/A 2,594
Schlumberger Ltd 8.0 N/A 1,673
Schlumberger Technology Corp – A2 1,021
Duke Energy Field Services Llc – Baa2 1,004Default Risk Premia 55
Table X: Estimated log-CDS panel regression (2), using daily median CDS data.
Estimate† Std. Error Estimate† Std. Error Estimate† Std. Error
Number of CDS Samples 33,912
Intercept 1.448 0.047
Slope 0.760 0.015
Sector-month dummy Oil and Gas Broadcasting and E. Healthcare
Dec-00 0.124 0.006 0.256 0.007 0.204 0.011
Jan-01 0.425 0.011 0.562 0.009 0.360 0.008
Feb-01 0.605 0.004 0.481 0.010 0.111 0.007
Mar-01 0.621 0.005 0.458 0.010 0.326 0.009
Apr-01 0.389 0.009 0.495 0.013 0.478 0.009
May-01 0.260 0.012 0.502 0.019 0.618 0.009
Jun-01 0.280 0.014 0.223 0.014 0.075 0.008
Jul-01 -0.044 0.015 0.145 0.016 0.019 0.010
Aug-01 -0.075 0.021 0.085 0.014 0.144 0.005
Sep-01 0.174 0.032 0.254 0.020 0.582 0.005
Oct-01 0.256 0.019 0.316 0.019 0.641 0.008
Nov-01 0.416 0.015 0.406 0.014 0.128 0.008
Dec-01 and Jan-02 0.227 0.017 0.352 0.020 0.465 0.011
Feb-02 0.306 0.020 0.551 0.023 0.508 0.021
Mar-02 0.229 0.018 0.582 0.021 0.478 0.021
Apr-02 0.209 0.016 0.576 0.024 0.424 0.015
May-02 0.270 0.015 0.661 0.024 0.542 0.014
Jun-02 0.200 0.016 0.651 0.024 0.396 0.009
Jul-02 0.162 0.018 0.970 0.030 0.487 0.012
Aug-02 0.278 0.017 1.005 0.031 0.556 0.012
Sep-02 0.171 0.018 0.861 0.029 0.332 0.011
Oct-02 0.253 0.019 0.830 0.031 0.427 0.012
Nov-02 0.175 0.018 0.712 0.029 0.412 0.013
Dec-02 0.157 0.016 0.522 0.028 0.418 0.014
Jan-03 0.125 0.016 0.348 0.027 0.320 0.015
Feb-03 0.126 0.015 0.269 0.026 0.217 0.014
Mar-03 0.060 0.014 0.251 0.024 0.015 0.010
Apr-03 -0.048 0.014 0.232 0.021 -0.004 0.009
May-03 -0.019 0.014 0.202 0.020 0.009 0.006
Jun-03 0.004 0.012 0.219 0.018 0.062 0.006
Jul-03 -0.143 0.012 0.131 0.015 0.035 0.007
Aug-03 -0.132 0.010 0.095 0.013 -0.036 0.005
Sep-03 -0.188 0.010 -0.068 0.013 -0.070 0.004
Oct-03 -0.251 0.011 -0.109 0.013 -0.073 0.004
Nov-03 -0.340 0.010 -0.193 0.009 -0.179 0.004
Dec-03 -0.245 0.007 -0.293 0.007 -0.228 0.003
Jan-04 -0.115 0.006 0.041 0.006 -0.135 0.001
Feb-04 0.052 0.004 0.241 0.006 -0.044 0.000
Mar-04 0.089 0.003 0.193 0.006 0.023 0.001
Apr-04 0.053 0.003 0.144 0.005 0.022 0.001
May-04 0.106 0.002 0.144 0.005 0.116 0.001
Jun-04 0.134 0.002 0.100 0.006 0.106 0.001
Jul-04 0.156 0.002 0.102 0.006 0.056 0.002
Aug-04 0.130 0.001 0.224 0.006 0.131 0.002
Sep-04 0.123 0.001 0.176 0.006 0.072 0.002
Oct-04 0.069 0.002 0.141 0.005 0.066 0.003
Nov-04 0.045 0.001 -0.013 0.004 0.130 0.002
Dec-04 reference -0.175 0.004 -0.001 0.002
Sum of Squared Residuals 8,742.760
Total Sum of Squares 34,098.286
R2 0.744
† Regressions are based on CDS data for the period December 2000 through December 2004.Default Risk Premia 56
Table XI: Fitted parameters of actual default intensity models
Ticker ˆ θ ˆ κ ˆ σ Ticker ˆ θ ˆ κ ˆ σ
253647Q † – – IPG 4.547 0.169 1.007
ABC 4.061 1.980 2.521 JNJ † – –
ABT † – – KMG 2.231 0.239 0.910
ADELQ 5.869 0.539 1.541 KMI 1.593 1.670 2.753
AGN 1.284 0.366 0.902 KMP 2.537 0.383 1.041
AHC 2.215 0.574 1.116 KRI † – –
AMGN † – – L 3.225 0.269 1.086
APA 2.211 0.298 0.909 LH 2.216 0.169 1.307
APC 2.033 0.238 0.855 LLY † – –
BAX 2.360 0.649 1.148 MCCC 6.124 1.034 1.522
BC 2.761 0.377 1.082 MDT † – –
BEV 4.740 0.586 1.424 MGLH 6.636 0.125 1.059
BHI 1.850 0.202 0.793 MMM † – –
BJS 2.897 0.730 1.310 MRK † – –
BLC 2.316 0.248 1.073 MRO 2.232 0.359 0.897
BMY † – – NBR 2.936 1.080 1.559
BR 1.897 0.401 0.994 NEV 4.562 0.274 0.955
BSX 1.813 0.701 1.822 NOI 3.571 1.196 1.900
CAH 2.183 0.595 1.293 OCR 2.445 0.245 1.311
CAM 3.167 0.592 1.101 OEI 4.192 0.331 1.227
CCU 2.445 0.390 1.483 OMC 2.755 1.209 1.769
CHIR 2.575 0.617 1.222 OXY -0.378 0.078 0.696
CHK 3.261 0.167 1.265 PDE 4.234 0.811 1.533
CHTR 11.718 0.116 1.062 PFE † – –
CMCSA 3.317 0.528 0.972 PHA † – –
CNG † – – PKD 5.741 0.141 1.201
COC 2.702 1.959 1.965 PRM 6.693 0.054 1.142
COP † – – PXD 3.777 0.437 1.311
COX 2.345 0.647 1.387 RCL 2.661 0.382 1.210
CVX † – – RIG 2.216 0.313 1.377
CYH 4.285 0.957 1.478 SBGI 5.183 0.677 1.500
DCX 3.502 0.680 1.353 SGP 2.861 0.149 0.571
DGX 0.408 0.154 0.856 SLB 1.846 0.289 0.871
DIS 1.773 0.360 0.879 SUN 2.452 0.307 0.933
DO 1.882 0.298 1.437 THC 3.526 0.393 1.002
DVN 2.274 0.335 1.392 TLM 1.886 0.278 1.200
DYN k – – TRI 4.189 0.656 0.842
EEP 1.657 0.194 0.867 TSG 3.678 0.241 1.255
ENRNQ ‡ – – TSO 4.097 0.544 1.299
EP 5.014 0.264 1.040 TWX 3.253 0.296 1.097
EPD 1.731 1.377 2.666 UCL 1.506 0.188 0.833
F 2.568 0.401 1.127 UHS 3.039 0.880 1.168
FST 4.478 0.825 1.345 UNH 1.786 0.302 1.235
GDT 1.618 0.562 1.083 VIA 2.133 0.657 1.452
GENZ 2.309 0.817 1.486 VLO 2.682 0.281 1.038
GLM 2.283 0.307 1.025 VPI 4.047 0.751 1.547
GM 3.008 0.974 1.358 WFT 2.132 0.189 1.102
HAL 2.967 0.407 1.457 WLP 2.646 0.740 1.469
HCA 2.004 0.427 1.740 WMB 3.699 0.211 1.258
HCR 2.679 0.361 1.016 WYE 1.812 0.536 0.875
HMA 2.115 0.259 0.961 XOM † † †
HRC 4.033 0.398 1.668 XTO 2.299 0.155 0.978
HUM 3.936 0.370 1.390 YBTVA 5.440 0.793 1.535
ICCI 6.164 0.610 1.402
† No estimates provided; the sample mean of the 1-year EDF is less than 10 basis points.
‡ No estimates within admissible parameter region; the estimate for the mean-reversion parameter κ is negative.
k Firm removed from data set.Default Risk Premia 57
Table XII: MC distribution of default intensity parameter estimates
ˆ θ ˆ κ ˆ σ
“true parameters” 4.00 0.50 1.00
10 years of data
mean 3.95 0.87 1.21
std. dev. (0.50) (0.40) (0.26)
50 years of data
mean 3.98 0.58 1.04
std. dev. (0.21) (0.15) (0.09)
Table XIII: Fitted parameters of default intensity models
Oil and Gas Healthcare Broadcasting and E.
Ticker ˆ θ Ticker ˆ θ Ticker ˆ θ
AHC 2.092 ABC 4.542 ADELQ 5.862
APA 2.863 AGN 1.775 BC 3.063
APC 2.410 BAX 2.289 BLC 2.248
BHI 2.674 BEV 4.701 CCU 2.485
BJS 3.230 BSX 1.974 CHTR 6.359
BR 1.707 CAH 2.320 CMCSA 3.436
CAM 3.429 CHIR 2.765 COX 2.479
CHK 5.379 DGX 3.926 DIS 1.503
COC 2.861 GDT 2.189 IPG 3.338
DO 2.632 GENZ 2.546 L 2.175
DVN 2.587 HCA 2.778 MCCC 5.943
EEP 2.094 HCR 2.805 OMC 2.883
ENRNQ 1.915 HMA 2.059 PRM 4.417
EP 3.647 HRC 4.025 RCL 3.219
EPD 2.529 HUM 3.667 SBGI 5.021
FST 4.863 LH 3.916 TSG 2.915
GLM 3.173 MGLH 5.789 TWX 3.278
HAL 3.260 OCR 2.959 VIA 2.289
KMG 2.198 SGP 1.400 YBTVA 5.324
KMI 2.328 THC 3.459
KMP 2.459 TRI 4.709
MRO 2.727 UHS 2.930
NBR 3.168 UNH 2.162
NEV 4.449 WLP 2.570


































Table XIV: Summary statistics by ﬁrm for risk-neutral default intensity models
Oil and Gas Healthcare Broadcasting and Entertainment
Ticker in J ? mean(λ∗/λ) median (λ∗/λ) Ticker in J ? mean (λ∗/λ) median(λ∗/λ) Ticker in J ? mean(λ∗/λ) median(λ∗/λ)
AHC 1 4.978 5.042 AGN 1 3.885 3.800 BC 0 1.084 1.096
APA 1 1.809 1.760 BAX 1 1.254 0.879 BLC 0 2.561 2.479
APC 1 1.516 1.362 BSX 1 2.755 2.741 CCU 1 2.164 1.635
BHI 1 1.250 0.963 CAH 1 1.823 1.817 CMCSA 1 3.139 1.491
BJS 1 2.028 1.006 CHIR 1 1.784 1.751 COX 0 3.673 3.327
BR 1 3.933 3.848 DGX 0 1.695 1.827 DIS 1 2.097 1.852
CAM 1 0.595 0.544 GDT 0 2.697 2.518 IPG 0 0.915 0.865
CHK 1 2.637 2.733 GENZ 0 3.397 2.092 L 0 2.112 1.495
COC 0 4.769 4.791 HCR 0 1.674 1.606 OMC 0 1.481 1.459
DO 1 1.927 1.763 HMA 0 2.515 2.523 RCL 0 2.128 1.819
DVN 1 4.119 3.263 HUM 1 1.083 1.045 TSG 0 0.496 0.296
EEP 0 6.696 6.899 LH 0 1.780 1.781 TWX 1 0.914 0.610
EP 0 2.673 1.837 SGP 0 1.240 1.078 VIA 1 2.351 1.924
EPD 0 14.622 14.599 UHS 0 1.272 1.252
GLM 0 1.184 1.104 UNH 0 4.222 3.944
HAL 1 3.375 2.185 WYE 1 1.915 1.812
KMG 1 2.790 2.590
KMI 1 8.009 7.280
KMP 0 3.564 3.342
MRO 0 2.396 2.431
NBR 1 1.162 0.896
NOI 0 0.535 0.451
OXY 0 5.169 5.108
PDE 1 4.712 4.450
PXD 1 7.650 8.328
RIG 0 1.188 1.104
SLB 0 1.659 1.560
SUN 0 3.257 3.072
TLM 1 5.707 5.407
UCL 0 2.741 2.701
VLO 1 4.761 3.883
WFT 1 0.828 0.765
XTO 0 7.523 7.542Default Risk Premia 59
Table XV: Sector CDS-implied Kalman-ﬁlter-based risk-neutral default intensity pa-
rameter estimates for the model speciﬁcation with measurement noise for both 1-year
and 5-year CDS
parameter Oil and Gas Healthcare Broadcasting and
estimates† Entertainment
ˆ β0 3.083 1.296 1.469
ˆ β1 0.164 0.424 0.133
ˆ β2 0.077 0.169 0.546
ˆ κu 0.423 1.052 0.761
ˆ σu 1.198 1.991 1.860
ˆ ρu 0.394 0.248 0.688
mean ˆ ˜ θi 3.769 1.451 2.456
ˆ ˜ κ = ˆ ˜ κu 0.350 0.377 0.350
SD (measurement noise) 0.058 0.055 0.000
sector likelihood 1.090 0.797 0.825
L∗ 0.646 0.836 0.768
no. ﬁrms 33 16 13
† The parameters are estimated using MLE. We assume that ˜ κ = ˜ κu, and restrict γ and θu to be
zero. For each ﬁrm i, we determine ˜ θi so that the model-implied average 1-year CDS rate equals
the observed average rate.Default Risk Premia 60
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Notes
1The one-year accuracy ratio, a traditional measure of accuracy for default predic-
tion, is 2
R 1
0 [f(x)−x]dx, where f(x) is the fraction of the ﬁrms that defaulted within
one year after the time of prediction that are within the lowest scoring fraction x of
ﬁrms, according to the predictive method.
2In a 2004 report, “High Yield Credit Default Swaps,” Fitch Ratings reports sub-
stantially higher recoveries for 2001-2003 for restructurings (52.7%) than for default
by missed payment (29.4%) or bankruptcy (25.3%).
3We used the following algorithm: (a) If a bid and an ask were present, we record
the bid-ask spread. (b) If the bid is missing, we subtract the average bid-ask spread
to estimate the ask. (c) If the ask is missing, we add the average bid-ask spread to
estimate the bid. (d) From the resulting bid and ask, we calculate the mid-quote as
the average of the bid and ask quotes.
4Under iid measurement noise, more precise estimates would be obtained by using
all CDS observations separately, rather than the median CDS observation. We prefer
using the median, given the potential damage caused by outliers.
5We also examined the ﬁt, by non-linear least squares, of the model, Yi = αX
β
i +ui,
which diﬀers from (1) by having a residual that is additive in levels, rather than
additive in logs. An informal comparison shows that the non-linear least-squares
model is somewhat preferred for lower-quality ﬁrms.
6For an EDF of 10 basis points, the model (2) implies a ﬁtted CDS rate of
e1.45+0.76×log 10+0.522/2, accounting for the eﬀect of normality of disturbances, and using
the fact that E(eX) = evar(X)/2 for a zero-mean normal random variable X.
7For example, for the oil and gas sector, the dummy coeﬃcients for August 2002
and December 2003 are 0.278 and −0.245, respectively, for a proportionate change in
ﬁtted CDS rates at a given 5-year EDF of e−0.245−0.278 − 1 = −0.41.
8 From the Moody’s sectoral data, the average recovery for the oil-and-gas sectorDefault Risk Premia 65
is estimated from the simple average of the of the Moody’s “Oil and Oil Services”
and the “Utility-Gas” sectors, at 48%. Broadcasting and Entertainment recoveries
are estimated at the ‘Media Broadcasting and Cable’ average of 38%, and Healthcare
at 32.7%.
9See Black and Karasinski (1991).
10We explored more tractable aﬃne jump-diﬀusion speciﬁcations, but the ﬁtted
short-horizon conditional sample variances of changes in intensity varied in a manner
much closer to linear in the square of intensity than to constant-plus-linear in the
level of intensity, as would be dictated by aﬃne models.
11Details are available from the authors upon request. The Matlab code can be
downloaded from the web site www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/aberndt/software/.
12Here, r is a progressively measurable process with
R t
0 |r(s)|ds < ∞ for all t, such
that there exists a “money-market” trading strategy, allowing investment at any time
t of one unit of account, with continual re-investment until any future time T, with
a ﬁnal value of e
R T
t r(s)ds.
13A more precise deﬁnition of L∗
t is given on page 130 of Duﬃe and Singleton (2003).
14This ignores the impact of a default event on the time-series properties of v, which
is small provided the inﬂuence of any one ﬁrm on the geometric average is small. In
our data, J includes those ﬁrms marked with “1” in Appendix C, which are essentially
the largest and most liquidly traded ﬁrms. As it happens, none of these defaulted
during our sample period. Details are provided in Table XIV in the appendix.






is larger by Jensen’s In-
equality than e−
R T
0 EQ(λ∗(t)) dt. Suppose that λ(t) is constant for simplicity, and con-
sider the natural assumption that the unconditional variance of λ∗(t)/λ(t) grows with
t. Then, even if EQ[λ∗(t)/λ(t)] does not depend on t, the ratio of the risk-neutral
to the actual probability of default by t would typically decline with maturity. This
eﬀect, however, is apparently more than oﬀset, empirically, for example by trends inDefault Risk Premia 66
E(λ∗(t)) or by market prices of risk associated with random changes in λ∗.
16We replace the restriction that ˜ κ = κ by the assumption that ˜ κ = ˜ κu. Moreover,
we lift the restriction of a constant market-price-of-risk parameter γ, and instead
determine ˜ θi for each ﬁrm i so that the model-implied average 1-year CDS rate is
equal to the observed average rate.
17For this model speciﬁcation, ˆ β2 = 0.546 for the broadcasting-and-entertainment
sector, compared to ˆ β2 = 0.169 and ˆ β2 = 0.077 for the healthcare and the oil-and-gas
sectors, respectively.
18For this study, Bohn, Arora, and Korablev (2005) considered U.S. public ﬁrms
with assets of at least $300 million dollars. Out of the total sample of 1594 ﬁrms at
the beginning of 2003, 12 defaulted.
19These data are available at moodys.com.
20The conditional mean default time converges to 2.5 years as the default proba-
bility converges to zero, at a constant default intensity.
21Moody’s KMV uses the beta distribution for its modeled recovery distributions
in its LossCalc model.
22Cao, Yu, and Zhong (2007) explore the ability of ﬁrm-level option-implied volatil-
ity to explain CDS rate changes.